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The Rigorous Thomist

A Blog by Rob Koons

God as Pure Act: The Modal Collapse Argument

6/22/2021

2 Comments

 
A central thesis of Thomas’s natural theology is the claim that God is a being of pure actuality—meaning that God is utterly lacking in passive potentiality. This follows quickly from the fact that God is absolutely the first cause, in the sense of being the cause even of other necessities. God is the only being that is necessary in Himself. In order to act as first cause, God must be in His very essence fully equipped with a complete complement of intrinsic properties. If He were not, then there would be a component of contingency or at most conditional necessity in His intrinsic state as the first cause, but any such component would require a still more primary cause, contradicting God’s status as absolutely first.
 
God lacks only passive potentialities: He possesses active potentialities (i.e., active powers) to the greatest possible degree. God can cause anything that is metaphysically causable—His active power is without limit. If it were limited, then this limit would require some cause, again contradicting God’s status as first cause.
 
God is, moreover, maximally free. He was free, in particular, to create nothing at all, or to create any cosmos that would be a fitting expression of His nature. There are many such possible cosmoses. Ours is just one. Hence, our cosmos is thoroughly contingent.
 
How is the contingent exercise of active power on God’s part consistent with His lack of passive potentiality? In Aristotelian metaphysics, there is no conflict, since the exercise of active power is an action, and an action takes place in the patient, not in the agent. God does not have to modify Himself in order to exercise His active power. He does not have to deliberate or plan, and His intentional action requires no internal representation in His mind. The truthmaker for God’s intentionally creating creature x is simply the existence of x itself. No difference internal to God is required to differentiate worlds in which God creates x from worlds in which He does not.
 
But, a critic may respond, isn’t God identical to His own action, given Thomas’s strong doctrine of divine simplicity? If so, the objection goes, since God exists necessarily, His action must exist necessarily, in which case everything that God creates must also exist necessarily.
 
It is true that Thomas embraces the thesis that God is identical to His own action. In Summa Contra Gentiles, I, chapter 45 and in Summa Theologiae I, Q14, article 4, Thomas argues that God’s act of understanding is identical to His essence. Since He is identical to His own essence, God is identical to His act of understanding. In Part II of the Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas claims both that God’s power is identical to His own substance, and that His action is identical to His power.
 
Ordinarily, the act of a power is distinct from that power. So, if I whistle a tune, my particular act of whistling is obviously distinct from my power of whistling. However, in God’s case, His act of understanding is identical to His power of understanding, and both are identical to God Himself.
 
The act of a power is the perfection of the power. A power that isn’t exercised is imperfect. So, if God’s act were distinct from His power of understanding, then that act would perfect His power. Furthermore, the perfecting of this power would be the perfecting of God’s essence. Hence, God’s perfection would depend on something other than God, which would contradict the fact that God is infinitely perfect. God’s act must be identical to God, so that it is God who perfects Himself.
 
An act stands to a power as actuality to potentiality. So, if God were not identical to His act, then His power of understanding would have a potentiality that is actualized by His act. But God has no passive potentiality. He doesn’t stand as potential to anything else. So, He must be identical to His own act.
 
The Modal Collapse Argument
 
Many critics of Thomas argue that he is committed to God’s willing necessarily everything that He wills, because of Thomas’s strong doctrine of divine simplicity. The argument typically goes something like this:
 
  1. God exists necessarily (Third Way)
  2. God is identical to His act of willing (Divine simplicity – SCG I.45 and II.9)
  3. God’s act of willing is identical to His act of willing to create this universe.
  4. So, God’s act of willing to create this universe exists necessarily. (From 1, 2, 3 by the law of identity)
  5. So, God necessarily wills to create this universe. (From 4?)
 
The argument is guilty of a fallacy of equivocation. Understood in one way, the term “God’s act of willing to create this world” picks out something that exists necessarily, namely, God Himself. Understood in a second way, the term picks out something that exists only if this world exists. On either meaning, conclusion 5 does not follow from sub-conclusion 4. On the second meaning, the phrase “God’s act of willing to create this universe” is actually a kind of quantifier: “There is something that is uniquely an act of willing by God to create this universe and…”
 
To make clear why 5 does not follow from 4 using the first meaning, the inference to 5 on that reading requires an additional assumption:
 
4b. God’s act of willing to create this universe is essentially God’s act of willing to create this universe.
 
On the first reading, assumption 4b is false. God’s actual act of willing (which is in fact an act of willing that He create this world) could have been an act of willing that He create a different world, or no world at all. Consider, for example, a parallel proposition:
 
BD. Ben’s father is essentially Ben’s father.
 
Not true—although I am in fact Ben’s father, there are possible worlds in which I have no children at all.
 
Critics of Thomas will complain that the cases are not parallel. Assumption 4b just must be true, because every act of willing has its own object essentially. My choosing a chocolate cookie for a snack could not have been my choosing an oatmeal cookie. Different objects necessarily imply different acts of will. However, this is wrong, for two reasons. First, because God is different from creatures. God does not have to undergo any kind of process of deliberation in order to make a choice. Hence, He and His act of will are exactly the same in every possible world. They have different objects in different worlds, but this difference is merely a Cambridge difference in God—it doesn’t require any internal modification. The objects of God’s choosing are immediately present to God as chosen by Him—they don’t have to be re-presented within God as chosen.
 
Second, even in the case of human actions, it is possible for the same act of human willing to have different objects in different worlds. I’m thinking of a case of spontaneous but voluntary action—acts taken without any prior deliberation, but which are nonetheless guided by the human will. Consider, for example a musician who is improvising as he plays, or a speaker who is speaking very rapidly. The notes or words that are chosen are chosen by will, and yet there need be no prior mental event guiding the action. The action has “voluntariness”, as Elizabeth Anscombe puts it, without being the product of some internal volitional event. In a different possible world in which the person chooses a different note or different word, there may be no internal difference despite the fact that a different choice was made. Consequently, there is no reason to deny that the very same act of will could exist in both worlds.
 
Let’s return to the argument and consider using the second meaning. On that interpretation, steps 4 and 5 look like this:
 
4c. There is something that is uniquely an act of willing by God to create this universe, and that thing exists necessarily.
5c. There necessarily exists something that is uniquely an act of willing by God to create this universe.
 
Again, 5c does not follow from 4c, unless we assume that anything that is in this world an act of willing by God to create a certain universe must be an act of God to create that same universe in every possible world in which it exists. Again, we have to assume that God’s act of willing is essentially an act of willing to create this universe specifically. And that Thomas will deny.
2 Comments
John DeRosa link
7/14/2021 08:48:20 am

Hi Rob,

Great blog post, keep them coming! I'd love if you could do one on a similar topic but instead of dealing with the apparent problem of God's unchanging will, you could deal with the apparent problem of God's unchanging knowledge.

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saint thomas of the internet
5/10/2023 08:39:54 pm

"The act of a power is the perfection of the power. A power that isn’t exercised is imperfect."

Basically the meaning of this is that if God didn't kill me yesterday, he lacks the power to kill me yesterday.

"God lacks only passive potentialities: He possesses active potentialities (i.e., active powers) to the greatest possible degree."

Meaning he doesn't have the power to do anything he didn't do. So your god doesn't have the power to create a purple elephant, as evidenced by him not having done so. Ergo, this philosophy is as false as can possible be.

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    Rob Koons, a professor of philosophy, trained in the analytic tradition at Oxford and UCLA. Specializing in the further development of the Aristotle-Aquinas tradition in metaphysics and the philosophy of nature.

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