From First Cause to Pure Actuality, 2.0

This is a revised version of my argument in this earlier blog:

If God is a necessary a being and uncaused, then He must lack all passive potentiality. Whatever intrinsic properties He has (qua God), He must have necessarily. Here's the argument.

First, I will need the concept of a logical moment. If agent A causes some effect E, then we can identify two logical moments, even if the action and the effect are temporally simultaneous. If agent A causes E, then agent A acts at one logical moment M1, and the effect is first in actuality at a posterior moment M2. The relation of priority/posteriority between logical moments is transitive and asymmetric. No logical moment is prior to itself, and no moment is prior to any moment that is prior to it.
 
We have proven that there are absolutely uncaused facts. These facts must belong to logical moments that are absolutely primal—i.e., logical moments that are posterior to no logical moments.
 
Second, I need the concept of a full complement of intrinsic properties. A substance x has a full complement of intrinsic properties at moment N with respect to its nature if and only if every property P is such that, if x has P intrinsically at some logical moment in some possible world, then x has either P or its negation intrinsically at N (with respect to that same nature).
 
Now I’m in a position to propose a basic principle about causality:
 
The Completeness of Agents (COA). Necessarily, if agent x acts at logical moment M to produce some effect, then x has a full complement of intrinsic properties at M with respect to its nature.
 
The rationale for COA is this: in order to act at a logical moment, an agent must actually exist in that moment. But an agent cannot actually exist at a moment without possessing a full complement of properties at that moment. If it didn’t possess such a full complement, it would fall short of actuality and would thereby be disqualified from acting.
 
I need one further principle:
 
The Groundedness of Intrinsic Properties. Necessarily, if an individual x has property P intrinsically at logical moment M, then there are some properties Q1 through Qn such that: x’s being P at M is wholly grounded by x’s having Q1 through Qn at M, and for each Qi, x’s having Qi at M is a basic, positive fact.

Let’s suppose that God is one of the agents acting at a primal moment M. Suppose for contradiction that God has some intrinsic property P at M contingently. By GA, there must be some basic properties Q1 through Qn possessed intrinsically by God at M, and God’s having P at M is wholly grounded by His having Q1 through Qn at M. We can assume that grounding is a necessitation relation. Consequently, God must have at least one property Qi contingently at M. If He had all of them at M necessarily, then He would have to have P at M necessarily as well.
 
Since it is a basic, positive, contingent fact that God possesses Qi at M, then this fact (by the PSR or principle of causality) must have a cause. But that is inconsistent with our assumption that M is a primal moment, and so no fact at M can have a cause.
 
Hence, God cannot possess any contingent intrinsic properties at logical moment M.
 
If it is necessary that God possess P intrinsically at M, there must be some explanation of this necessity. A logical moment is not a thing in its own right, but simply a node in the causal network of the world. So, if it is necessary that God possess P intrinsically at M, this must be a result of God’s essence, and a result of God’s essence alone, since there are no prior facts to appeal to. But if God’s possessing P is a result of God’s essence alone, then He must possess P necessarily at ever logical moment in every possible world, and not just at M.
 
Suppose that God has an intrinsic property P at moment N. Since God has a full complement of properties at the primal moment M, God must either have P or its negation at M. So, God qua God must have P necessarily at all logical moments in all possible worlds. Hence, God has all His intrinsic properties necessarily at every logical moment.
 
Here’s another way to look at this. Why can’t God lack some intrinsic property P at primal moment M, such that God could gain P in some subsequent logical moment? For a thing x to lack a possible intrinsic property is for it to have an intrinsic character of a certain kind. This intrinsic character must be a positive fact about x. Either the absence of P is grounded by x’s having some contrary intrinsic property Q, or else there is some totality property T [1] of x that encompasses the fact that x’s total complement of intrinsic properties does not include P. In either case, there is a basic, positive fact about x that must be causally explained (given the PSR).

When God lacks a particular intrinsic property (with respect to His divine nature), this absence is not a mere absence but a kind of privation. Contingent privations are causable facts, and so the PSR requires that they all have actual causes (see Haldane 2007). Consequently, God cannot have (qua God) any contingent privations in the primal moment M. It is not possible for Him to subsequently gain intrinsic properties in His divine nature, since He has with necessity a full complement of intrinsic properties.
 
Since God has every intrinsic property essentially, He must be a being of pure actuality, with no passive potentiality. Consequently, He must be timeless.
 
[1] A totality property is a constituent of what David M. Armstrong (1997) called totality facts. A totality fact about some particular substance would entail that the substance lacks any intrinsic property not contained in some totality C. Totality facts are basic, positive facts that ground truths about privations.