

Proof of God: A Philosophical Case for Christian Realism
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Introduction

I. Scientific Realism Depends on Theism

“Science and Theism: Concord, Not Conflict,” in *The Rationality of Theism*, edited by Paul K. Moser and Paul Copan (Routledge, London, 2003), pp. 72-90.

“The Incompatibility of Naturalism and Scientific Realism,” in *Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal*, ed. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (Routledge, London, 2000), pp. 49-63; reprinted in *The Nature of Nature*, edited by Bruce L. Gordon and William A. Dembski (ISI Books, 2011).

“Epistemological Problems with Materialism,” in *The Waning of Materialism*, edited by Robert C. Koons and George Bealer (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2010), pp. 281-308.

“The General Argument from Intuition,” forthcoming in Trent Dougherty and Jerry Walls, *Two Dozen or So Arguments for God’s Existence: The Plantinga Project*.

“Reason and Religion,” in *The Routledge Handbook on Contemporary Philosophy of Religion*, edited by Graham Oppy (New York: Routledge, 2015).

II. God’s Existence can be Proved

A. The Cosmological Argument

“A New Look at the Cosmological Argument,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 34 (April, 1997): 171-192.

“Defeasible Reasoning, Special Pleading, and the Cosmological Argument: A Reply to Oddy,” *Faith and Philosophy* 18 (April 2001):192-203.

“God’s Existence,” in *Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Metaphysics*, Daniel D. Novotny and Lukas Novak (eds.). (Oxford: Routledge, 2013).

“Epistemological Foundations for the Cosmological Argument,” *Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion: Volume 1* (Oxford, 2008), edited by Jonathan Kvanvig, pp. 105-33.

“Epistemological Foundations Refined: A Reply to Oppy,” unpublished.

B. The Kalam Argument

"A New Kalam Argument: Revenge of the Grim Reaper," *Noûs* 48 (2014):256-267.

C. The Design Argument

"Post-Agnostic Science: How Physics has revived the Design Argument," unpublished.

"Are Probabilities Essential to the Design Argument?" unpublished.

D. The Ontological Argument

"Sobel on Gödel's Ontological Proof," *Philosophia Christi* 8 (2):235-248.

III. Christian Faith is Reasonable

"Dual Agency: A Thomistic Account of Providence and Human Freedom," *Philosophia Christi* 4(2002): 397-410. Translated as "Zweifache Akteurschaft: ein Thomistisches Modell von Vorsehung und menschlicher Freiheit," in *Göttliches Vorherwissen und menschliche Freiheit: Beiträge aus der aktuellen analytischen Religionsphilosophie*, edited by Eleonore Stump, Georg Gasser, and Johannes Grössl (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2014). I argue that the Thomistic model of God as the cause of all contingent fact is compatible with human freedom, drawing on Austin Farrer's concept of *dual agency*.

"What God Maximizes: A Deontic Solution to the Paradox of Evil", unpublished. I argue for the compatibility of Christian theism with the existence of evil by relying on the fact that the God's goodness consists in love for particular persons, not in maximizing some total of impersonal good. God's love for us is compatible with His inaction in the presence of our suffering given certain deontic constraints, whose existence is essential to our personal identity.

"Bob and Carol and Tess and Ali: The Epistemology of Religious Pluralism," *Sophia* 45, 2 (2006). A defense of Plantinga's contention that belief in Christianity can be properly basic despite the presence of believers in competing religions who make comparable claims.

"Faith, Probability, and Infinite Passion," *Faith and Philosophy* 10:145-160 (April, 1993). A decision-theoretic interpretation of Søren Kierkegaard's definition of faith as an "infinite passion," employing hyperreal (infinite) utility values.

"Divine Persons as Relational Qua Objects: An Interpretation of Aquinas's Account of the Trinity," *Religious Studies* (forthcoming).

Conclusion